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178 BOivrPENSIERO v. SuPERIOR CouRT r 44 c.2(l 
[L. A. No. 23513. In Bank. J\Iar. 18, 1955.] 
FRANK BOMPENSIERO, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR 
COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY et al., Ilespondents. 
[1] Judges-Disqualification-Bias and Prejudice: Proceedings.-
Remarks by trial judge while presiding over separate trial 
of some persons named in indictment for having participated 
in acceptance of bribes by public official in connection with 
granting liquor licenses, that Board of Equalization should 
"revoke the licenses of those that were ralled before a body, 
under oath, and refused to testify on the ground that whatever 
testimony they might gi\·e would tend to ine1·iminate them," 
did not show sufficient basis for disqualificatilln of judge in 
another trial on ground of personal bias and prc>judiee against 
defendant who had refused to testify in the prior trial, and 
judge was not in error in striking such statement, where it 
was made in criminal prosecution in which defendant was 
only indirectly im·olved as a witness aml without indieation 
that he was being singled out. 
[2] Id.-Disqualification-Proceedings.-~A statl'lllPnt of disquali-
fication which is not verified as prescrilwd by § 170, Code Civ. 
Proc., is formally defeetive and is properly ~trieken out by 
the trial judge. 
[3] Indictment and Information-Motion to Set Aside: Prohibi-
tion-Criminal Proceedings.-Probable cause is shown if man 
of ordinary caution or prudence would be led to believe and 
conscientiously entertain strong suspicion of accused's guilt, 
and indictment will not be set aside or prosecution thereon 
prohibited if there is some rational ground for assuming pos-
sibility that offense has been committed and accused is guilty 
of it. 
[4a, 4b] Grand Jury-Proceedings-Review of Action of Grand 
Jury.-Grand jury was justified in believing that each of trans-
actions in which bribe was accepted on behalf of district liquor 
control administrator was part of single general conspiracy 
to invoke bribe for each new liquor license issued throughout 
district, and that petitioner was part of such conspiracy, 
where similarity of manner in which contact was made with 
restaurant owners seeking licPnses and bribery accomplished 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Grand .Jury, § 15. 
McK. Dig. References: 111 .TudgP~. ~~ -tn, ;)(); I:~] ,Judge~, ~ 5(): 
[:!] IndietmPJJt :md Information, ~SS(7): Prohibition, ~-tl; Ill 
Onmd .Jury, ~ :ll : I;") J ('ouspiraey, ~ Ll-; r ()] Cons pi I'H(',V, ~~ 13, Hl; 
[7] Couspinl<',\', ~lH; [H] Brilwr.v, ~B.il; [!lj Crimiwll Law,~;);); 
[10] Criminal Law,~ HH; Bribery,~ 1il.;i. 
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tewled to :magest ('OJHmon plan of purtiripation, where 
district administrator's discussion with employee in his office 
eonel'lrning advisability of having petitioner "talk to" certain 
applicant for li<:<'IJSP suggested some reason to suppose he would 
agre.e to do so, and where petitioner's statement to such appli-
cant in regard to issuance of general license after a year im-
plied knowledge of nwnner in which district administrator and 
his associates generally operated. 
[5] Conspiracy-Indictment.--Direct proof of formal understand-
ing between parties to conspiracy is not required as basis of 
indictment or information. 
[6] !d.-Statute of Limitations: Evidence.---Proof that one of 
overt acts in furtherance of conspiracy occurred after time 
before which statute of limitations would be a bar is suffi-
cient, and evidence of acts occurring before that time may be 
received to show conspiracy. 
[7] !d.-Indictment and Information-Proof and Variance.-
Though there is no direct evidence to connect accused with 
offense charged in indictment that he and others asked and 
agreed to receive a bribe, where general conspiracy reasonably 
may be supposed to have existed prosecution may proceed on 
theory that criminal offense in furtherance of conspiracy is 
charged. 
[8] Bribery-Statute of Limitations.-Renmnably construed, Pen. 
Code, § 800, prescribing six-year limitation for indictment for 
acceptance of bribe by public official or public employee, 
refers to those statutes (see Pen. Code, §~ 68, 86, 93, 165) 
under which a public official who "asks, receives, or agrees to 
receive a bribe" may be punished, there being no proviSIOn 
which expressly makes punishable acceptance of bribe by 
public official or public employee. 
[9] Criminal Law-Principals and Accessories.-Reasonably con-
strued, Pen. Code, § 971, abrogating distinction between ac-
cessory before fact and principal and between principals, 
Pxpres~es legislative intent to abolish distinctions made at 
common law as to various types of participants in commission 
of crime and to make all of them subject to same procedural 
and substantive limitations. 
[10] !d.-Statutes of Limitation: Bribery-Statutes of Limitation. 
-Pen. Code, § 800, placing in one category any felony other 
th;cm murder, embezzh•JtJent of public money and acceptance of 
bribe by public official or public employee, and in another 
[ 5) See Cal.Jur.2d, Conspirary, § 20 et seq.; Am.Jur., Conspiracy, 
§ 29 et seq. 
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 40 et seq.; Am.Jur. Crim-
inal Law, § 72. 
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category of a bribe, does not of 
limitation based on identity of 
among types of criminal acts, and person who aids and abets 
public official to receive a bribe is to statute of limi-
tations though not a public officer. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of San Diego County and John A. Judge 
thereof, from trying petitioner on an indictment. \Vrit denied. 
Augustine, Bryans, Hagen & 0 'Connor and J:i'rank Desimone 
for Petitioner. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, \Villiam E. James, 
Deputy Attorney General, James Don Keller, District At-
torney (San Diego), Barton C. Sheela, and Jack R. I_jevitt, 
Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondents. 
EDlVIO~DS, J.-By this proceeding in prohibition, Frank 
Bompensiero challenges the jurisdiction of the superior court 
to try him upon an indictment which names him as one of 
several persons who participated in the acceptance of bribes 
by a public officiaL He questions the sufficiency of the 
indictment to charge, and of the evidence before the grand 
jury to establish, the alleged crimes. He also attacks the trial 
judge's action in striking from the record a statement disput-
ing the qualification of the judge to rule upon preliminary 
motions. 
According to the evidence before the grand jury, Charles E. 
Berry was District Liquor Control Administrator of San 
Diego and Imperial Counties. It was the practice of the 
Board of Equalization to rely upon the recommendation of 
the district administrator as to the issuance of a new on-sale 
liquor license. Berry was the sole official in the district 
c'mpowered to make such a recommendation. 
Several owners of cafes or restaurants in the district testi-
fied that they paid substantial sums of money in excess of 
the statutory fee to obtain a new license. In a typical trans-
action the owner, having made unsuccessful application to 
the office of the district administrator, would contact a third 
party intermediary who assertedly could arrange to have the 
licens<' issued. Upon payment to that person of several thou-
sand dollars, the owner was instructed to renew his applica-
tion with the assurance that a license would be forthcoming. 
After a new application, the license issued through normal 
channels. 
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~wrre named in the indictment with Bom-
acter1 as intermediary between Berry and 
the restaurant ow1wrs. However, in only one transaction is 
linked with the granting of a license. 
Tlle cvidcnc(' in that regard is as follows: 
fn the winter Gillenberg approached Provart, 
an in the district administrator's office, and discussed 
the of a seasonal on-sale license. .After 
two Ol' tlmce of sueh conversations, Provart spoke to Berry 
about the nmtter. agreed that Gillenberg could qualify 
for a but ProYart was instructed to tell him it would 
cost $5,000 to have it issued. A counterproposal of $3,500 
was made to Proyart and conveyed to Berry. They discussed 
1he adyisabilit.y of having Bompensiero "talk to" Gillenberg, 
and Provart was told to tell Gillenberg that "Frank will come 
and see him." 
A man who identified himsrlf as "Frank B." called upon 
Gilll'nberg anr1 told him he could get a license but it would 
eost ~When Gillrnberg expressed doubt, he was told 
to ask Proyart if "I•'rank B. is all right and if I know what 
I am talking abont." Proyart assured him that Frank B. 
could be drpended upon. 
A short time later, Gillenberg made application for a 
seasonal li0cnse. Two or three weeks passed without action 
upon it. He then rrceiYed a telephone call instructing him 
to meet Frank B. in the lobby of a designated hotel and to 
have tbe money with him. There he met the man prrviously 
identified t.o him as I~rank B., and they discussed payment. 
A cashier's cheeh: for $5,000 at :first was refused, but aftrr 
further conwrsntion ihe check, which when presented to the 
grand jnry bore the indorsement ''Frank Bompensiero, '' was 
aceepted. 'l'lH' Jieens~' was issued in April, 1951, and soon 
afterwards, Brrry gave Provart $400 as his share of the 
"Gillen berg deal." 
Gillenberg Jwrl been told by Bompensiero that after a year 
from the time the seasonal license would be issued, he 
eonlcl rrapply and n•crive a general license. Such an appli-
('ation vms mar1e b~· Gillenberg in October, 1952. After about 
1 hrPe ~weeks in which no action upon the application was 
taken, a man identifying himself as Bennett called upon 
(lillenlwrg. Bennrtt told him he eould obtain a general licrnse 
only aft,,r pa;vnwnt of $2,500. Gillenberg agreed and paid 
ilw amount to Bennett in cash. A few days later he reapplied 
for the general license, and it was issued. 
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The indictment was returned on September 1, 1934. In 
Count I, Bompensiero and several other persons are accused 
of ''Conspiracy to Commit the Crime of Asking and Receiv-
ing Bribes by a Public Officer'' in that they ''within 3 years 
last past . . did agree to ask and receive bribes on behalf 
of Charles Berry.'' Eight overt acts in furtherance of the 
alleged conspiracy are asserted, including Bompcnsiero 's in-
struction to Gillenberg, on F'ebrnary 27, 1951, to apply for a 
seasonal license and Bennett's demand for $2,500 for a gen-
eral license made on October 25, 1952. 
In Count X, it is alleged that Bompensiero and others on 
April 3, 1951, "did ask and agree to receive" a bribe from 
Gillenberg upon an understanding that the votr, opinion or 
action of Berry upon matters officially before him wonld be 
influenced. A similar charge is made in Count XI, in which 
it is asserted that Bompensiero and others "did ask and agree 
to receive a bribe" from Gillenberg on October 25, 1952. 
The indictment also included several other charges against 
Bompensiero. 
\Vhen arraigned, Bompensiero moved to quash the indict-
ment and filed a written demurrer to it. All of the counts 
against him were dismissed except Counts I, X and XI, with 
regard to which his motion was denied and the demurrer 
owrruled. He then filed an "Affidavit and Application for 
Removal of 'l'rial Judge.'' The eonrt ordered the document 
stricken on the ground that it was frivolous and sham. 
As grounds for issuing the writ of prohibition Bompensiero 
eontencls that the trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction in 
striking the ''statement and affidavit'' from the reeord. He 
also argues that the evideuee before the grand jury is in-
suffieient to establish probable eause for believing him guilty 
of the offenses eharged in Counts I and XI. Count X, he 
asserts, on its faee shows thr bar of the statute of limitations. 
[1] 'rhe ground of asserted disqualifieation of the trial 
judge is "personal bias and prej udiee" against Bompensiero. 
allegedly demonstrated by two statements made by him while 
presiding over a separate trial of some of the persons named 
in the indietment. In that proeeeding, Bompensiero was 
calle(l as a witnrss fot· the proseeution and rdu::;ed to answer 
on the ground that his testimony might tend to ineriminate 
him. Sevpral other wi1ttess<>s were ealled and dainH•d the 
sanw privilege. During arguments upon a motion for a new 
trial, the trial jndge remarhd that he had "believed the 
witnesses for the prosrention" and expressed the opinion that 
Mar.l955J BoMPENSIERO v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
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"if the Board of Equalization wants to do their duty, I think 
what they should do, instead of pieking on these fellows that 
came in here, they should also revoke the licenses of those 
that were called before a body, under oath, and refused to 
testify on the ground that whatever testimony they might 
give would tend to incriminate them.'' Bompensiero asserts 
that he holds a liquor license and thus is in the category 
mentioned in the latter statement. 
These remarks, made in a criminal prosecution in which 
Bompensiero was only indirectly involved and without indi-
cation that he was being singled out, show so little basis for 
claiming personal bias or prejudice against Bompensiero as 
to justify the conclusion that the charge of disqualification 
is sham and frivolous. In that circumstance, the trial judge 
was not in error in striking the statement and affidavit. (Of. 
People v. Darby, 114 Cal.App.2d 412, 439 [250 P.2d 743] ; 
People v. McOullottgh, 100 Cal.App.2d 101, 111 [223 P.2d 
37] .) [2] There is also another basis for the order. Section 
170 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that, in a court 
of record, a statement of disqualification of the trial judge 
''shall be verifit>d by oath in the manner prescribed by section 
446 of this code for the verification of pleadings.'' Bompen-
siero 's statement was not verified and, upon that ground, is 
formally defective and was properly stricken out. (Of. People 
v. Kirk, 98 Cal.App.2d 687, 693 [220 P.2d 976].) 
With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the indictment, Bompensiero urges that Count I charges only 
a single, general conspiracy to ask for or receive bribes on 
behalf of Berry. As he views the evidence before the grand 
jury, it does not show that he conspired with any of the 
other persons accused of being intermediaries for Berry, but 
connects him only with Berry aud Provart. The count may 
not reasonably be construed as charging a series of isolated 
conspiracies, he argues, but even if it may be so read, the 
only one which includes him terminated more than three years 
before the indictment was returned and is barred by section 
800 of the Penal Code. 
[3] Probable cause is shown if a man of ordinary caution 
or prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously en-
tertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. (People 
v. Nagle, 25 Cal.2d 216, 222 [153 P.2d 344] .) An in-
dictment will not be set aside or a prosecution thereon pro-
hibited if there is some rational ground for assuming the 
possibility that an offense has been committed and the accused 
lS 
:Jil [2Hi 
:::ct :n H, :122 1121 P .::ld 
[4a] The evidence before tho 
question as to "Whether it :oho\YS 
conspiracy existed and that 
of it. 'l'he of manner in which 
"With the restaurant owners and the 
a elose 
was a part 
contaet was made 
tends strongly to a common of 
although that evidence alone probably "Would not show Born-
's connection with it. 's discussion 
with Provart conceming the advisability of Bompen-
sicro ''talk to'' Gillen berg suggests some reason to suppose 
he >Yould agree to do so, possibly beeansc llc llad acted in a 
similar capaeity previously. Bompensiero 's statement to 
Gillrmberg in regard to the issuanee of a general license 
after a year implies knowledge of the manner in whieh Berry 
and his 1:ssociates generally operated. Also, in each case the 
bribe given for a general lil;eJJsc was either ,000 or $7,500; 
i he requirement that Gillen berg pay an additional $2,500 for 
the general liel:nse aftr·r paying $5,000 for the seasonal one, 
>Yas eousi:;tcnt with this pattern. 
[5] The rnle governing the sufficiency of the evidence to 
justify a snspicion of a conspiracy has been summarized as 
f ollmn:: "Direct proof of' a formal understanding between 
pa1·ties to the co1:spiracy is not required as the basis of an 
indictment or information. '[I]t 'vas not necessary for the 
State io rn·oye that the parties actually came together, mu-
i ually discussed their common design, and after reaching a 
formal agreement set out upon their previously agreed course 
(J[ condnct. 'I'he extent of the assent of minds which are 
iuvolved in a conspiraey may be, and from tlw secrecy of 
the rrime usually must be, inferred by the jury from the 
proofs of the facts and circumstances which, when taken to-
gethPr, apparently indicate that they are parts to the same 
c~ompkte whole.' '' (Lorenson v. Super£or Court, sttpra, 35 
Cal.2c1 57-58.) [ 4b] The grand jury was justified in the 
belief that each of the transactions in which a bribe was 
aceepierl was part of a single general eonspii·acy to invoke 
a bribe for each new liquor license issued throughout the 
distritt. 
[6] In this situation, tlJe prosecution of the crime charged 
in Connt I is not barred. Proof that one of the overt acts 
in furthPranec of the eonspiracy occurred after the time 
before whid1 tlw statute of limitations would be a bar is 
Mar.1955] BoMPENSIERO v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
[ 44 C.2d 178; 281 P.2d 250] 
185 
sufficient, and evidence of acts occurring before that time 
may be received to show the conspiracy. (People v. Gordon, 
71 Cal.App.2d fi06, 629 (163 P.2d 110] .) Here, several overt 
acts are alleged to have occurred within three years prior 
to the date the indictment was returned. 
[7] Bompensiero correctly contends that there is no direct 
evidence which connects him with the offense charged in 
Count XI. since a general conspiracy reasonably 
may be supposed to have existed, prosecution under this count 
may proceed upon the theory that a criminal offense in further-
ance of the conspiracy is charged. 
Bompensiero argues that under section 800 of the Penal 
Code,~· the applicable period of limitation for the offense 
charged in Count X is three years. He points out that it is 
there alleged that the offense was committed on or about 
April 3, 1951, more than three years preceding the return 
of the indictment. The position of the attorney general is 
that the six-year period specified for "the acceptance of a 
bribe by a public official or a public employee" is applicable. 
[8] Count X does not charge that he accepted a bribe, 
but only that he "did ask and agree to receive" a bribe. 
However, the offense charged in that count is in the language 
of section 68 of the Penal Code, which in turn is similar in 
wording to other provisions which prescribe punishment for 
a public official who ''asks, receives, or agrees to receive'' a 
bribe. ( Cf. Pen. Code, § § 86, 93, 165.) There is no provision 
which expressly makes punishable "the acceptance of a bribe 
by a public official or a public employee." Reasonably con-
strued, section 800 refers to those statutes under which a 
public official who ''asks, receives, or agrees to receive a 
bribe'' may be punished. 
Another argument is that Bompensiero is not a ''public 
official or a public employee," and is charged only with aiding 
and abetting a public official to receive a bribe. Construed 
strictly in his favor, he asserts, section 800 may not be read 
as prescribing the six-year period for one, not a public official, 
who merely participates in the receipt of a bribe. 
*An indictment for any other felony than murder, the embezzlement 
of public money, the acceptance of a bribe by a public official or a 
public employee, or tlJt, falsification of public records, must be found, 
and information filed, or case certified to the superior court, within three 
years after its commission. An indictment for the acceptance of a bribe 
by a pnblic official or a public employee, a felony, must be found, and 
tl1e informntion filed, or case certified to the superior court, within six 
years after its commission.'' 
18G BmrPExsn:no 1'. SrPEIUOR Cm:nT [HC.2(1 
In jurisdictions '' lwre commis-
sion of a erimina1 act is made the statnte 
of limitations ll'hieh coni-rols for tbe eriE1iual act 
is held not to apply to ihr oirense of am1 abetting. 
The general statntc of limitations applicable 1u "other of-
fenses" is hel(1 to eontrol. 8/!t/c, (Tex.Crim. 
App.) H7 S.\Y.2d 111, 112: State 71 IU. 151 
[ 43 A.2c1 54, 58, HiO A.T,.R . ) But in thn Patriarea casP 
it \Yas speeifirally stated that a clif!'rreut rnle might apply 
when the I_jegislatnre has remoye(l the distindion between 
nne who eommits a e1·imc and one who aic!s in its eommission. 
'l'he comt said that it "must follmv the common law, a;.; long 
as our legislature does not abrogate it and deelare aeeessorics 
before the faet to be principals." (P. 58.) And in 8tate v. 
Baehmeycr, 247 Wis. 294 [19 X\Y.2d 261], it wa;;, held that 
the statltte of limitation applieahk to the substantive offense 
applies to one who participates as a principal. 
[9] Section 971 of the P('llal Co(1e nroYicles in part . 
''The distinction bt't\H'eu an aecessory before the fac·t and a 
principal, and between principals in tbe first and sceond 
degree, in cases of a fdony, is abrogated; am! all persons 
concerned in the (~ommission of a felony, whether the~· directly 
commit the act constituting the offense, m· ai(1 and abet in 
its commission, though not prest•nt, shall hereafter be prose-
entecl, tried, and punished as principals .... '' (Emphasis 
added.) Reasonably eoustrued, this seetion expresses a legis-
lative intent to abolish the distinctions made at eommon law 
as to the Yariotls typc~s of participants in thn cmnmission of 
a erime and to mal\c all of t}J,m subjeet to the same proeeclural 
and substantive limitations. 
[10] Seetion 800 of tlw p,~ual Code pro\·ides 110 exeeption 
to this rult'. Contrary to BompensiPro 's posH ion, it cloes not 
specify a period of limitation based npon the identity of 
the offender, but differentiates among the types of criminal 
acts. It plaees in one category "any other felony than 
munler, the embezzlement of public money, the acceptance of 
a bribe by a public official or a publie employee, or the falsifi-
cation of public records." (Emphasis added.) It places in 
another category tllf' ''acceptance of a bribe.'' Because 
Bompensiero may lw proseeuied, trie(l and punisht'd as prin-
('ipal for the eriminal 11d of " of a bribe by a 
nubli(; offieial," Cou11t X of tl11' itH1ietmunt iR not barred by 
I im it at ion. 
l\1ar.1955] BOMPENSIERO v. SUPERIOR COUR'l' 




Gibson, C. J ., Shenk, 
Spence, ,J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
denied and the alternative writ 
Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Count I charges Bompensiero and several other persons 
with a general conspiracy to commit the crime of asking 
and receiving bribes by a public officer. Count X charges 
that Bompensiero and others on April 3, 1951, did ask and 
agree to receive a bribe. Count XI alleges that Bompensiero 
and others on October 1952, did ask and agree to receive 
a bribe. 
I do not believe that there was evidence sufficient to support 
a reasonable belief that Bompensiero was involved in a general 
conspiracy as alleged in Count I, nor that there was any 
evidence or inference connecting Bompensiero with the crime 
alleged in Count XI. 
To show that there was sufficient evidence against petitioner 
the majority opinion states : ''The similarity of manner in 
which contact was made with the restaurant owners and the 
bribery accomplished tends strongly to suggest a common plan 
of participation, although that evidence alone probably would 
·not show Bornpcnsiero's connection with it. However, 
Berry's discussion with Provart concerning the advisability 
of having Bompensiero 'talk to' Gillen berg suggests some 
reason to suppose he would agree to do so, possibly because 
he had acted in a similar capacity previously. Bompensiero 's 
statement to Gillenberg in regard to the issuance of a general 
license after a year implies knowledge of the manner in which 
Berry and his associates generally opc,rated. Also, in each 
case the bribe given for a general license was either $7,000 
or $7,500; the requirement that Gillenberg pay an additional 
$2,500 for the general license after paying $5,000 for the 
seasonal one, was consistent with this pattern." (Emphasis 
added.) 
In other words, it is held that the similarity of the plan 
of operation of bribery is "probably" not enough to show 
petitioner's connection with it, then that connection is pur-
portedly shown by reliance on such similarity. The majority 
points to only two other bits of evidence to fortify the simi-
larity in evidence, namely: (1) That Berry's discussion 
with Provart about having petitioner talk to Gillenberg, 
188 
tbe pt:rson who was to pay the brilw money, indieates peti-
tioner would talk to Gillenberg, and (;iOJJer's statement 
to Gillcnberg that application should bc made for a general 
license by Gillenberg after a year. Those two items of evi-
dence arc not sufflcient, either separately, or in 
conjunction •vith the admittedly weak 
of contacting the bribers. It seems unreasonable to say that 
because Berry and Provart, his assistant, diseusscd the pos-
sibility of haviug petitioner speak to Gillenberg about the 
bribe, a conspiracy is proven either between and peti-
tioner or among petitioner and the other persons working 
for Berry. 'rhat a person (Berry) will talk to another person 
(petitioner) about committing a crime (bribery) may indicate 
that the former thinks the latter will be receptive to the 
proposition but it does not show that the latter would in fact 
be receptive to it or would conspire with him or with other 
persons in carrying out Berry's orders. If it did it would 
mean that if one person thinks that another wonld commit 
a crime, then there is evidence that the other would agree 
to commit it. It is not only no proof of the conspiracy but 
it docs not even raise a reasonable suspicion. 
Petitioner's statement to Gillenberg that the latter should 
apply for a general license after operating for one year 
under the seasonal license does not indicate ''knowledge of 
the manner in which Berry and his associates generally oper-
ated." None of the other evidence in this case makes any 
reference to seasonal licenses. There is not the slightest 
intimation in the record that it was the general yJract,ice of 
Berry and the other defendants to arrange for the issuance 
of a seasonal license, followed in one year by the issuance 
of a general license. Indeed, this very fact-that Gillenberg 
was to get a seasonal license only-is an indication of dis-
sim1:larity between the acts in which Bompensiero participated 
and any other acts of bribery to obtain a license. It is evidence 
tending logically to a belief that there was no general con-
spiraey involving petitioner. Gillenberg testified, " ... this 
Frank B. told me that I would get a general license after 
operating a year. ... He said that I would automatically 
get a general license and for me to go in and apply after 
I had operated a year which I did, you sec, and, of course, 
I found that out not to be true after I went in to get the 
license." (Emphasis added.) The logical inferences which 
could arise from such events would be: (1) 'rhat :B'rank B. 
thought that the population of Jacumba, the location of 
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Gillenberg's establishment, would be such in one year that 
Gillenberg, could qualify for a general license; or (2) 
that Frank B. believed that it was the practice of the 
Board of Equalization to issue a general license after one 
year's operation under a seasonal license; or (3) that Frank 
B. believed that the $5,000 payment would satisfy Berry, 
and that the general license would be issued without the 
necrssity of further bribery, i.e., that Frank B. was in woeful 
ignorance of '' th0 manner in which Berry and his associates 
genera1ly operated.'' 
The fact that an additional bribe of $2,500 was obtained 
before the general license was issued to Gillenberg, bringing 
the total bribe to $7,500, again lacks any logical reference to 
petitioner. Not one word of evidence was offered which 
directly or by inference connected petitioner with this later 
act of bribery. In one transaction Gillenberg paid $5,000 to 
obtain a seasonal license. Later, desiring a general license, 
he paid an additional $2,500. The ''going rate'' of bribery 
for a general license was $7,500. These facts illustrate nothing 
more than the time-worn and probably dubious maxim that 
there is ''Honor even among thieves.'' They indicate that 
Berry did not want to charge Gillenberg more than the going 
rate for a general license, for fear that Gillenberg would 
complain of the overcharge in too loud a voice. Again, I 
feel that it should be emphasized that no evidence was offered 
which in any way connected petitioner with the $2,500 bribe 
in October, 1952. 
Even if it is assumed that there was sufficient evidence to 
show that petitioner conspired with Berry, there is no evi-
dence which even remotely connects petitioner with the other 
JWrsons working for Berry, and thus there is no evidence 
fihowing a general conspiracy. It is conceded by the majority 
that to constitute a general conspiracy, there must have been 
an agreement not just among Berry, petitioner and Gillenberg, 
but also among petitioner and the other per·sons working for 
Berry. It appears that Berry, being in a position to give 
or refuse licenses had various persons whom he used to solicit 
bribes from parties desiring licenses. There is no evidence 
indicating any connection among those persons other than 
that they oerasionally worked for the same person, Berry. 
'l'he only reasonable inference is that there iR no agreement 
amow~· those persons, since Berry, for his own protection, 
would keep his various henchmen in ignorance of his opera-
tions as between each other. 
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It seems clear to me, therefore, that the Grand Jury of 
San Diego County did not have before them suffic:ient evidence 
to justify a reasonable belief that petitioner was guilty of 
the crimes alleged in Counts I and XI of the indictment. 
The major point remaining for discussion is vvhether thr 
prosecution of Bompensiero for the offense charged in Count 
X is barred by the statute of limitations (Pen. Code, § 800). 
The majority opinion points ont two specific facts by reason 
of which it should have held, but did not, that snch prosecu-
tion is barred by the statute of limitation: (J) "Count X 
does not charge that he [Bompensicro] accepted a bribe''; 
(2) " ... Bompensiero is not a 'public official or a public 
t>mployee.' " Penal Code, section 800, imposes a three-year 
limitation on the bringing of an indictment for any other 
felony than murder, the embez::dement of public money, the 
acceptance of a bribe by a public official or a p7tblic employee, 
or the falsification of public records. A six-year limitation 
is imposed on the bringing of an indictment for the acceptance 
of a bribe by a p1tblic official or a public ernployee. 
In its decision on the two points enumerated above, the 
majority has employed a process of reasoning from one 
statute to another to arrive in the end at what it describes 
as a reasonable construction of Penal Code, section 800. I do 
not quarrel with the "reasonableness" of its construction. 
The point which I desire to emphasize is that this is not the 
only possible construction of the statute; and, as this court 
has repeatedly held in tbe past, "\Vhcn language which is 
reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal 
law ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to 
the offender will he adopted. In other words, criminal statutes 
will not be built up 'by judicial grafting upon legislation .... 
[I] t is also true that the defendant is entitled to the benefit 
of every reasonable doubt, whether it arise out of a question 
of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words or the con-
struction of language used in a statute.' " (People v. Ralph, 
24 Cal.2d 575, 581 [150 P .2d 401] ; People v. Valentine, 28 
Cal.2d 121, 143 [169 P.2d 1, 167 A.L.R. 675]; In re lJJcVickers, 
29 Ca1.2d 264, 278 [176 P.2d 40]; In re Bramble, 31 Cal.2d 
43, 51 [187 P.2d 411]; People v. Chessman, :38 Cal.2d 166, 
182 [238 P.2d 1001] ; Ex prwte Hoscnhcim, 83 Cal. 388, 391 
123 P. 3721; People v. 8ayr·e, 26 Ca1.App.2d Supp. 7fi7, 761 
[70 P.2d 546].) 
rl'lHo question here ]Jr<>sented is one of first impression in 
this state. Only one r.ase (State v. Bachrneyer, 247 \Vis. 294 
1[ar. 1955] GAim:\ER 1'. BAt'rcn Brtos. Co1-JS'l'RUCTION Co. lBl 
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!19 N.\\T.2d 2fH, 26:31) is cited which reaches the same) result 
as the majority \V e are not bound by 
that case, decided to the law of a sister state. I feel 
that we arc bound by the long established, eminently just 
policy set out in the eases decided in our own state, by this 
very court. 
'l'he writ of prohibition sought by petitioner should be 
granted. 
Petitioner's applic~ation for a rehearing was denied April 
13, 1955. Carter, ,J., \vas of the opinion that the application 
shoulcl be grant("d. 
[L. A. No. 23339. In Bank. Mar. 29, 1955.] 
HAY A. GARDNER et al., Hespondents, v. BASICH 
BROTHERS CONS'l'RUOTION COMPANY (a Corpora-
tion) et al., Appellants. 
[la, lb] Automobile Stages-Rules and Rate Regulations.-Rules 
and rate regulations prescribed by Public Utilities Commis-
sion for contract highway carriers become part of every con-
tract between highway contract carrier and shipper, and 
parties are dt)emed to have contracted with such provisions 
in mind. 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Actions-Limitations.--Where agreement by licensed 
highway carriers with highway construction contractors to 
haul certain materials by dump truck was entered into by 
parties themselves and was in parol, applicable statute of 
limitations in carriers' action to recover undercharges ( dif-
ference between what was paid at hourly rate and larger 
amount allegedly due at ton-mileage rate) is two-year period 
governing action on oral contract (Code Civ. Proc., § 339, 
subd. 1) rather than three-year period for action ou liability 
created by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. 1). 
[3] Limitation of Actions-Liability Created by Statute.-A lia-
bility created by statute, within purview of three-year statute 
of limitations (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, sub d. 1), is one in which 
[1] See Am.Jur., Motor Transportation, §~ 17, 39. 
[3] See Oal.Jur., Limitation of Actions, ~ 76 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Limitation of Actions, § 48. 
McK.~Dig. References: [1] Automobile Stages, § 1.1; [2, 4, 5] 
Automobile Stages, § 16; [3] Limitation of Actions, § 45. 
